Abstract. Digital signature schemes are crucial for applications in electronic commerce. The effectiveness and security of a digital signature scheme rely on its underlying public key cryptosystem. Trapdoor functions are central to public key cryptosystems. However, the modular exponentiation for RSA or the discrete logarithms for ElGamal/DSA/ECC, as the choice of the trapdoor functions, are relatively slow in performance. Some multivariate schemes has potentially much higher performance than other public key cryptosystems. We present a new multivariate digital signature scheme (TRMS) based on tractable rational maps. We also give some security analysis and some actual implementation data in comparison to some other signature schemes.
Introduction
Digital signature schemes are crucial for applications in electronic commerce. For example, to improve the efficiency and maintain the order of stock exchange, each on-line transaction needs to be verified to be validated. The effectiveness and security of a digital signature scheme rely on its underlying public key cryptosystem. Trapdoor functions are central to public key cryptosystems. Only a handful of the many schemes attempted reached practical deployment. However, the modular exponentiation for RSA or the discrete logarithms for ElGamal/DSA/ECC, as the choice of the trapdoor functions, are relatively slow in performance. One main reason is the size of the single operand which (at the required security levels) tends to be huge, and this slows the performance.
Some multivariate schemes distinguish themselves from other public key cryptosystems by showing potential for higher performance. For example, Courtois, Goubin and Patarin proposed SFLASH, which has been selected by Nessie Consortium and recommended for low-cost smart cards. The newest version of this signature scheme, SFLASH v3 may be found in [12] . Also, Chen and Yang gave a class of signature (TTS) scheme based on tame transformations in [4, 5, 38] . The newest version of TTS, called Enhanced TTS, outperforms ( [40] ) all previously known digital signature schemes of comparable security levels, including SFLASH v3 . A summary of this newest instance may be found in [38] . Here we will present a new class of multivariate digital signature scheme (TRMS) based on tractable rational maps. TRMS has similar security and performance as Enhanced-TTS. However there is a small yet non-negligible chance (around 7%) that signing takes perceptibly longer in the newer versions of TTS. In contrast, the signing time for TRMS is constant, which can do no harm and may be an improvement.
Fix a finite field K and a natural number n. Tractable rational maps on K n are invertible affine transformations or, after a rearrangement of indices if necessary, functions of the following form ϕ : where for i = 2, 3, . . . , n, p i , q i , f i , g i are polynomials, and for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, r i is a permutation polynomial on K. That is, r i is a polynomial function which is also a bijection from K onto itself.
. For any point in the image set of S, it is very easy to find point-wise inverse for tractable rational maps: Given a point (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n ) ∈ ϕ(S), we can easily compute (
. . , y n ). When ϕ is an invertible affine transformation, we can easily write the inverse transformation ϕ −1 in an explicit and simultaneous way. That is, we have an explicit formula from which we can compute x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n simultaneously. When ϕ is not an invertible affine transformation, although it is computationally infeasible to write the inverse in an explicit and simultaneous way, given any point (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n ) ∈ ϕ(S), it is very easy to compute x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n in a sequential way. We simply apply a sequence of substitutions as follows. We refer to this as substitution property.
Note that, by Lagrange interpolation, any map over a finite field is a polynomial map. There are both computational and categorical reasons that we put our maps in rational form. For computational reasons, it is faster to compute the division between two function values by low degree polynomial maps than to compute a single function value by a much higher degree polynomial map. For example, it is much easier to compute 1 x than to compute x 254 over GF (256).
And categorically, even given a tractable rational map without denominator, by the direct computation above, the inverse of that map is most naturally described as a rational map. Therefore we choose to put the map in the rational form. For details, see [36] . TRMS is the result of exploring the combination of substitution property of tractable rational maps and other mathematical ideas into application of digital signatures.
In [26] , T. Moh invented a public key cryptosystem (TTM) based on tame automorphisms which also have the substitution property. It is easily seen that tame transformations are special cases of tractable rational maps with the term
replaced by x k . Therefore it is not surprising at all that TRMS based on tractable rational maps can achieve similar security and performance as TTS based on tame automorphisms. However, there are also substantial differences between TRMS and TTS with respect to other mathematical ideas and designs. In section 2, we give the details of TRMS. In section 3, we give some actual implementation data. In section 4, we give some analysis and compare TRMS to other signature schemes, in particular, including TTS.
Details of TRMS
We show an implement scheme of TRMS. It can be seen that there are a variety of schemes of TRMS which are all based on tractable rational maps.
Let K = GF (2 8 ). We will construct 3 maps ϕ 1 :
with π a projection, i an imbedding, and ϕ 2 identified as a tractable rational map over some extension field over K. All the details are given below. The public key or the verification map V is the result of the composition map ϕ 3 • ϕ 2 • ϕ 1 . Therefore the public key will only be seen as 20 quadratic polynomials in 28 variables whose size is about 8.7KB as shown below.
The private key or the key part in the signing map S is the triple (ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 , ϕ 3 ) in some specified structured form whose size is about 0.4KB as shown below. As mentioned in the introduction, each ϕ i gives direct instruction to find the point-wise inverse for any concrete instance. Therefore the private key holder or the signer can directly apply ϕ Then get the signature w = ϕ
Details of ϕ 1 and ϕ 3
Since GF ( 2 32 ) is finite extension fields of K of degree 4, therefore we can identify an element in K 4 as an element in GF ( 2 32 ). Furthermore, we can de- 
1. S 1 is a circular shift on K 28 and S 3 is a circular shift on K 20 . 2. T 1 is a translation on K 28 and T 3 is a translation on K 20 . T 3 is used to cancel the constant terms in the public key. Therefore T 3 is not chosen but determined. 3. L 1 is a 7 × 7 lower triangular matrix over GF (2 32 ) and L 3 is a 5 × 5 lower triangular matrix over GF (2 32 ) such that both with diagonal entries equal to 1 ∈ GF (2 32 ). 4. D 1 is a 28 × 28 invertible upper triangular matrix over K and D 3 is a 20 × 20 invertible upper triangular matrix over K in the following form:
. U 1 is a 7 × 7 upper triangular matrix over GF (2 32 ) and U 3 is a 5 × 5 upper triangular matrix over GF (2 32 ) such that both with diagonal entries equal to 1 ∈ GF (2 32 ).
Note that circular shifts on K n are indeed linear transformations on K n and each T i above represents the translation part in the corresponding affine transformation. The LDU decomposition above covers quite a part of general invertible linear transformations. Moreover, our construction enjoys some benefits in key size. With
5 , key size of the private key is reduced. Also, the calculation speed of additions is optimized on current 32-bit computer hardware structure. The diagonal entries in L's and U 's are 1 implies that when we solve Lu = v or U u = v we only have to do additions and multiplications and don't have to bother to do any division. Furthermore, with D 1 and D 3 both linear over K but not on GF ( 2 32 ), and also the circular shifts over K n , we can choose ϕ 1 , ϕ 3 linear over K, but not linear over GF (2 32 ). The purpose is to maintain security at the level over K. 2 • i, and we have the following in ϕ 2 :
Details of
. . .
where c i 's are constant parameters of user's choice and u * n v denotes first identifying u, v ∈ K n in the extension field with degree n then carrying out the multiplication there. For details see Appendix. 
. . . 
where c i 's are constant parameters of user's choice.
The reason why the formulas in the above assignments represents a permutation polynomial r 3 
Simply let p 2 to be the polynomial representation for P.
It is worth to mention the following.
1. For theoretical purpose we showed above that ϕ 2 is viewed as π • ϕ 2 • i where
is a tractable rational map with polynomials p 2 , f 2 , f 3 , p 4 , f 4 , p 5 , f 5 possibly very complicated. Computationally, we actually follow the other way around. That is, ϕ 2 is a computationally efficient representation for ϕ 2 when restricted to the subspace i(K 28 ). We get benefits on calculation speed due the following. The second assignment in ϕ 2 can be carried out in the subfield GF (2 48 ) instead of in L = GF (2 144 ). For details see appendix. Similarly, the third assignment in ϕ 2 can be carried out in L = GF (2 16 ) instead of in L = GF (2 144 ). Both these contribute on calculation speed. 2. It is easily seen that our ϕ 2 representation is quadratic in x i 's. Since ϕ 1 , ϕ 3 are affine maps, the public key is 20 general quadratic polynomials in 28 variables without constant terms.
Information on Keys
As shown above, Bytes. However, T 3 in ϕ 3 is not chosen but determined. Hence it is to choose 376 nonzero elements in K to generate the private key. Also, since the public key is 20 general quadratic polynomials in 28 variables without constant terms, its size is 20·( 28 · 29 2 +28) = 8680 bytes. In general, there are two ways to generate the public keys. One way is the method of undetermined coefficients, the other one is to make the composition by direct computation. Both have many optimized variants. Our major concern is on the structure of TRMS, therefore we did not put much effort in the optimization of the key generation. 
Performance

Analysis and Comparison
Security Analysis
For brevity, we fix the following notations for our TRMS example:
-m = 20 denotes the dimension of the hash space.
-n = 28 denotes the dimension of the signature space.
-q = 2 8 denotes the size of the base field GF (256).
There are several known attacks for multivariate cryptosystems. [38] , Let an "oil-set" be any set of independent variables x i , such that any of their cross-products never appears in any equation in ϕ 2 . Suppose the maximum size of an oil set is k, then then we may determine in time k 4 q n−2k−1 the "vinegar" and the "oil" subspaces. After that, several possible techniques may be used to find a solution. If case k = 9, so the time taken to identify the vinegar and oil subspaces is about 2 86 multiplications, or 2 80 3DES units. Patarin Relations Attack for C * Family: In ϕ 2 of our TRMS example, there is no Patarin relation, which means the attack for C * family is not feasible for our system. Affine Parts Distillation: Geiselmann et al. in [19, 20] pointed out the possibility that if the middle portion of any multivariate system is homogeneous of degree two, then it is possible to find the constant parts of both affine mappings easily. The ϕ 2 in our TRMS example is not homogeneous. XL Family and Gröbner Bases: Courtois et al proposed the XL method for solving overdetermined quadratic system (which can be viewed as a refinement of the relinearization method by Kipnis-Shamir, [24] ) and its variant FXL in [11] . Faugère ( [15, 16] ) have been improving algorithms for computing Gröbner Bases, and the current state-of-the art variant is F 5 , which was used as the critical equation solver in breaking the HFE challenge 1 ( [17] ). The consensus of current research ( [1-3, 13, 39, 41] ) is that Gröbner/XL-like equation solvers on generic equations are exponential in the number of variables. The best variant will be FF 5 if O(n 2+ε ) timing can be achieved, and FXL otherwise. The time complexity for the two methods on a system with m = 20 equations will be respectively 2 74 and 2 76 3DES units, still better than RSA-1024 (see [29] ). If m = 24, then we would get 2 80 and 2
81
respectively.
Remark:
The speed estimates on nongeneric equations are still being debated, but the converse to Moh's lemma was proved in [39] , which shows that it is likely that all Gröbner/XL-like equation solvers will run into trouble if the dimension of the projective solution set at infinity (denoted dim H ∞ ) is non-zero. It is not very easy to benefit from this, however, because the UOV attack means that the last stage of our sample TRMS scheme or something similar cannot be too large, and the dual rank attack dictates that it cannot be too small! Thus for m = 20, we cannot benefit dim H ∞ > 0, because the last stage is forced to be 9 variables. For larger TRMS schemes, say m = 28 upwards, we can start to do better with optimal selection of parameters. in [7] . However, they are mainly designed for small finite fields, and we may follow the computations of [4] to find a complexity of 2 120 3DES units.
Comparison to Enhanced-TTS
The structure of the latest version of TTS, Enhanced-TTS is as follows. Fix a finite field K. Choose three natural numbers m, n, k such that m < n and k < n − m. Let ϕ 1 , ϕ 3 are invertible affine maps on K n and K m respectively. Let ϕ 2 : K n → K m be of the following form. (Below f i 's are all quadratic and
To sign a message, Enhanced-TTS needs to solve two systems of equations for finding one inverse image point of the middle map. There is about 1/25 chance of redoing the signing procedure for the implement in [38] . However, our TRMS example has constant signing time, since the non-zero element in a field is always invertible.
Regarding to signing time, TRMS is better than TTS. One reason is that TRMS utilizes special field extension structure to reduce the computation time for ϕ −1 2 , the details is in the Appendix, while TTS only uses the common method of Gaussian elimination. Another reason is that during computation of the affine transformations ϕ 1 , ϕ 3 , part of it is also carried out in a larger field, which will benefit the computation, too. We like to point out that there are a lot of ways to construct ϕ 1 , ϕ 3 . One reason for us to use the LU -decomposition is that it has advantages when implemented on smart cards.
The main external differences between TRMS(20,28) and Enhanced-TTS (20, 28) can be tabulated as follows.
1. The private key size for TTS is 1.4KB, while for TRMS it is 396 bytes. 2. Regarding to signing time, TRMS is better than TTS. 3. TTS has at most 7% chance of redoing the signing procedure while the signing time for TRMS is constant. 
Appendix: Implement of Field Extension
Similarly, we have t 2 +t+(1000, 0000, 0000, 0000) 2 is irreducible over GF (2 16 According to the calculation above, to solve ax = y, we need 21 multiplications and one inverse operation in GF (2 32 ), which is roughly 342 multiplications in K. Comparing to TTS, doing the Gaussian elimination for two 9 × 9 matrices, it takes at least about 2 × 9 3 /3 ≈ 500 multiplications in K.
Note: There will be a extended version at IACR eprint archive.
